Opyn Contracts Audit

Opyn is a generalized noncustodial options protocol for Decentralized Finance, or DeFi.

The team asked us to review and audit the system. We looked at the code and now publish our results.

The audited commit is c34598565cba2bfcf824eb2da63d95c7f5dda4fa and the contracts included in the scope were:

  • OptionsContract.sol,
  • OptionsUtils.sol, and
  • OptionsFactory.sol.

The scope did not include the files inside the lib folder, Migrations.sol, and the OptionsExchange.sol.

All external code and contract dependencies were assumed to work correctly. Additionally, during this audit, we assumed that the administrators are available, honest, and not compromised.

System Overview

The core of the system is in the OptionsContract which defines how options work, and the OptionFactory contract which deploys OptionContract as needed.


The OptionsContract defines an ERC20 compliant token called oToken as well as the functions for options. Parameters such as the expiration time, collateral, underlying asset, etc. are set at the deployment stage by the address that creates the option. These parameters can be changed by the admin after deployment. Once an option is deployed, the creator will be able to provide collateral and issue oTokens in return. The system gets the asset prices from the Compound Oracle and requires over collateralization through collateralizationRatio to ensure a safety margin. When the ratio of collateral / underlying assets drops to an unsafe margin, the system allows a liquidation process to help itself stay collateralized. Liquidation allows any user to burn oTokens in exchange for the same value of collateral with a bonus, essentially reduces the number of oTokens in circulation. Before the option expires, anyone with oTokens can exercise their option to get the promised collateral back by providing underlying assets. After an exercise event, the Repo owners will be able to collect the proportional remaining collateral along with the underlying assets transferred during exercise.


The OptionsFactory contract deploys OptionContracts as needed. It defines a white list of assets that can be used as collateral, while ETH and ERC20 tokens can be used as strike or underlying assets. Any user can call the factory contract with the right parameters to deploy a new option contract. The owner of all contracts is the deployer of the factory, and also the admin, which has special power like updating option parameters, managing asset white list, etc.

Here we present our findings

Audit Update

The Opyn team applied several fixes based on our recommendations and provided us with an updated fix commit 3adfd9afa6d463869d9e0a78cc7f316ae34eb89e. We address the fixes introduced under each individual issue. Please note we only reviewed specific patches to the issues we reported. The code base underwent some other changes we have not audited, and can be reviewed in depth in a future round of auditing.

Critical Severity

[C01][Fixed] Malicious users could steal from the OptionsContract contract

The require statement in Line 249 of OptionContract contract is not using the SafeMath library.

Let’s assume that in the OptionsFactory the assets have been already added, that now == 500, and that UserA calls the createOptionsContract function to create a new type of Option. There, UserA passes to the function the following time parameters:
_expiry = 1000
_windowSize = 1001

Using those values, a new OptionsContract is created, and both windowSize and expiry are simply assigned without checks.

At this moment, UserB calls openRepo, then addETHCollateral or addERC20Collateral, and then issueOTokens. So far, the only time requirement in all those functions was:

require(block.timestamp < expiry);

Because 500 < 1000, it does not revert.

UserC received the issued oTokens and let’s supose that the underlying asset dropped its value, so UserC wants to exercise.

Here it is the first and only time that windowSize is actually used. The new time requirement is:

require(block.timestamp >= expiry - windowSize);

Because it is not using SafeMath, expiry - windowSize == 1000 - 1001 == (2**256 - 1) - 1 so the statement 500 >= (2**256 - 1) is false.

For that reason, the put holder cannot exercise his right and the contract will continue until expiry comes, where the repo owner will call claimCollateral and because its requirement is:

require(block.timestamp >= expiry)

UserB can withdraw the collateral, taking the premium without having any obligation to insure UserC with his underlying asset.

This problem comes from having a time checkpoint with a dynamic size, as it was addressed in the issue [L06] Confusing time frame for actions”, and for not using the SafeMath library when it is needed. Consider using the SafeMath methods for this operation and fixed time checkpoints along with inner checks during the set up.

Update: Fixed. The require statement now uses SafeMath library.

High Severity

[H01] Liquidation process could push the protocol into insolvency

Under certain asset price change conditions, the liquidation process could push the protocol into insolvency. The design of the current liquidation process incentivizes liquidators by providing them with a liquidation bonus. However, at times when the protocol is already under collateralization stress, offering a liquidation bonus plus, in Opyn’s case, a protocol fee, will push further the particular Option into insolvency. Essentially these actions work against the original purpose of the liquidation function.

In the following chart we explore how the protocol’s insolvency state is affected during a liquidation event, generated by the collateral to oToken price fluctuation, together with 3 variables: collateralizationRatio, liquidationIncentive, and liquidationFee.

On the left, we issue Vo value of oTokens with collateral value of Vc:
Vc = Vo * CollateralizationRatio

On the right, when total collateral value drops to Vc1, collateralization ratio drops, allowing someone to proceed with the liquidation. Assume that a user provides Lo value of oTokens for liquidation and that the Repo is under liquidationFactor. Then, the amount of collateral that will be deducted is:

Lo * (1 + liquidationIncentive + liquidationFee)

After this liquidation event, looking at the leftover oToken value and the leftover collateral value, if the leftover the collateral is less than the leftover the oToken value then the protocol is insolvent. Which means:

Vc1 - Lo(1 + liquidationIncentive + liquidationFee) < Vo - Lo

together with Vc = Vo * collateralizationRatio from the left part of the chart, we can get:

Vc1 < Vc/collateralizationRatio + Lo(liquidationIncentive + liquidationFee)

Which basically means that when the new value of collateral drops to this level, the liquidation process will push the protocol into insolvency. Plus from this moment on, and because the collateralization ratio is still low, further liquidation events are still allowed. Such events will further push the protocol deeper into insolvency.

Consider setting up an offline observation mechanism to ensure liquidation events happen as fast as they can before the price gets closer to the mentioned value.

Update: The Opyn team is implementing a liquidator bot to help solve this issue.

[H02][Partially Fixed] Malicious Admin can steal from the protocol

Currently an EOA (Event Oversight Administrator) has a lot of privileges over the control of the whole protocol, from setting up initial variables to updating critical values like Oracles and market parameters. For instance, liquidationIncentive, liquidationFactor,liquidationFee,transactionFee, and collateralizationRatio.

These privileges render the admin with exceptional power over general users, where it could override parameters set up in the deployment. This design puts the whole protocol in a vulnerable state if the admin account is hacked or an internal admin becomes malicious. For example, a malicious admin could easily steal from the protocol by setting a high liquidationFee.

Consider the use of an multi-sig account and time-locks to improve the safety of the contract against the powers of a malicious admin.

Update: Partially Fixed in the follow-up commit 3adfd9afa6d463869d9e0a78cc7f316ae34eb89e. The team has put some restrictions on the parameter update function which restricts admin power when assigning values. The team has also indicated they are working on a multi-sig solution to further protect the admin account.

Medium Severity

[M01][Fixed] Potential race condition with Repo ownership transfer

Currently a Repo owner can transfer the ownership by calling transferRepoOwnership. A malicious original owner could front run this transaction with another one that puts the Repo in a worse collateralization status, For example, mint more oTokens and remove collateral. This could potentially harm the new owner.

Depending on how the arrangement for the ownership transfer has been done and how important this function is and the risk it presents, we recommend the team to consider solutions accordingly such as: implementing a time lock and allow the proposed new owner to accept the ownership, state the risk clearly to users in documentation or remove this function all together.

Update: Fixed in the follow-up commit 3adfd9afa6d463869d9e0a78cc7f316ae34eb89e where this function is removed.

[M02][Fixed] Lack of event emissions after sensitive changes

It is beneficial for critical functions to trigger events for purposes like record keeping and filtering. However, functions like updateParameters, transferFee, and transferCollateral will not emit an event through inherited ERC20 functions, if the collateral is ETH.
Consider double checking all critical functions to see if those trigger events properly.

Update: Fixed in the follow-up commit 3adfd9afa6d463869d9e0a78cc7f316ae34eb89e where events were added to critical functions.

Low Severity

[L01][Fixed] Not following check-effect-interaction pattern

In the issueOTokens function of the OptionsContract contract a Repo owner can mint new oTokens and send them to a third party.

Once the check confirms that the new amount of oTokens is safe, it mints them and transfers them to the destinatary.

There is an issue with the order of the operations: First the oTokens are minted, and then the put balance of the Repo is updated .

Although a reentrancy cannot happen in this case, to preserve a safer check-effect-interaction pattern, consider inverting the order of those operations.

Update: Fixed in the follow-up commit 3adfd9afa6d463869d9e0a78cc7f316ae34eb89e where _mint function is only called after vault.oTokensIssued has been updated.

[L02] Different behavior between ETH and Tokens collateral

The project allows the usage of ETH or ERC20 tokens as collateral. Because ETH is a coin and not a token, it does not have a contract which keeps the account balances nor an address defined for that asset.

The project solves this by pretending that ETH is an ERC20 compliant token in the zero address.

This is a type of semantic overload over the zero address, which is used for two purposes. 1. to represent ‘ETH contract address’. 2. to show if a token asset is supported or not by checking if the desired asset has changed its address in the tokens mapping from the default zero address.

Another problem is that if in the future the project needs to support only ERC20 token collaterals, ETH cannot be removed from the supported assets when the deleteAsset function is called.

Consider treating ETH as a different collateral type instead of adapting it to a ERC20 compliant token or add the necessary functionalities to keep up with the token based ones.

Update: The Opyn team explained they always plan on supporting ETH as a collateral asset hence didn’t remove it.

[L03] Cannot update exponent after deployment

The OptionsContract allows the admin to update parameters such as liquidationIncentive, liquidationFactor, liquidationFee, transactionFee, and collateralizationRatio, by calling the updateParameters function.

Nevertheless, only the value of those variables can be changed. The exponents of those Number variables cannot be changed.

Consider letting the function updateParameters to update also the exponents used in the project.

Update: The Opyn team explained that the exponent cap is there on purpose. They don’t anticipate taking a fee lower than 0.01% so the extra precision is unnecessary

[L04][Fixed] Miscalculated maxCollateralLiquidatable in liquidate function

In the OptionsContract, the liquidation function checks if the liquidator is not liquidating more than the Repo‘s allowance by calculating maxCollateralLiquidatable with the liquidationFactor on the Repo‘s. However there is a math mistake during the calculation in line 518: if the liquidationFactor.exponent > 0, the maxCollateralLiquidatable is calculated as

maxCollateralLiquidatable.div(10 ** uint32(liquidationFactor.exponent))

but this should be

maxCollateralLiquidatable.mul(10 ** uint32(liquidationFactor.exponent))


This bug is not really exploitable because liquidationFactor should be always <= 1 , which means liquidation.exponent should be always < 0.

Consider fixing the math issue, or simply remove it from the condition liquidationFactor.exponent &gt; 0 since it should never happen.

Update: Fixed in line 630 of the follow-up commit 3adfd9afa6d463869d9e0a78cc7f316ae34eb89e.

[L05][Partially Fixed] Not using SafeMath

Besides the critical vulnerability found in “[C01] Malicious users could steal with and from the OptionsContract contract”, in OptionsContract there are more places where it is not used or badly used, such as:

  • Line 509: uint256 amtCollateralToPay = amtCollateral + amtIncentive
  • Line 582: collateralizationRatio.exponent + strikePrice.exponent

Although the first one is unlikely to cause an overflow or underflow, consider using the SafeMath library to eliminate any potential risks. In the last situation, because the variable type is int32, SafeMath cannot be used there. Consider instead adding extra checks to ensure the operation is not performing any underflow or overflow.

Update: Partially Fixed in the follow-up commit 3adfd9afa6d463869d9e0a78cc7f316ae34eb89e where first issue is fixed with SafeMath but second issue remains unfixed.

[L06] Confusing time frame for actions

In an option there is a period in which certain actions such as creating repos, adding collateral, liquidating a repo, or burning oTokens, have to be executed prior the expiration time (expiry) of the contract.

There is alaso an exercise action that can be done only during a specific time window defined by the windowSize variable (which closes at expiry).

Instead of subtracting the windowSize from expiry to know the start point where exercise can be executed, it is clearer to define 2 variables: startsExercisability and endsExercisability.

Consider changing the logic to have a start time where these actions can be executed and an end time where the contract expires.

Note: this issue is related to “[C01] Malicious users could steal with and from the OptionsContract contract” and any mitigation should consider both simultaneously.

Update: The Opyn team explained the exercise window allows for the existence of both American and European Options. American Options can be exercised at any time until expiry, European Options can only be exercised on the last day or so.

[L07][Fixed] Repo owner could lose collateral if leftover oTokens are not burnt before the option expires

Currently, Repo owners are allowed to freely mint oTokens by providing collateral. However, there is no way for the Repo owner to redeem the corresponding collateral for any unsold oTokens after the option expires. The Repo owners are supposed to burn all unsold oTokens before expiry to avoid losing the corresponding collateral.

While this design works and makes sense, it is quite risky for the Repo owners and it is unclear that Repo owners are bearing risks of being stuck with their own oTokens.

Consider adding more documentation and warnings in the code to further advice Repo owners, or only allow issuing oTokens when a trade occurs.

Update: The team confirmed this is an expected behavior, comments are added in line 442 of the follow up commit to ensure users are only issuing oTokens when a trade occurs.

[L08][Fixed] Factorize Repo ownership into modifier

In several functions of the OptionsContract, such as issueOTokens, the function is marked as public but further restricts the operation to only the Repo.owner inside the code.

Since this pattern appears in several functions, consider implementing a isRepoOwner() modifier to write less error-prone code instead of copying the code to check repo ownership in each function independently.

Update: Fixed in the follow-up commit 3adfd9afa6d463869d9e0a78cc7f316ae34eb89e where repos was replaced by newly introduced vaults. The function locates targeted vaults through vaults[msg.sender] and runs a check on if current msg.sender has a vault using hasVault(msg.sender).

[L09][Fixed] Unbalanced ETH operations

In OptionsContract contract, there is a payable fallback function that allows ETH to be sent to the contract but there is no way to withdraw.

Consider adding a withdraw function to the contract or do not accept ETH in the fallback function.

Update: Fixed in the follow-up commit 3adfd9afa6d463869d9e0a78cc7f316ae34eb89e where the payable fallback function was removed.

[L10] Unbounded loops

The Repos and the deployed OptionContracts are registered by pushing the Repo structs and the contract addresses into the repos and optionsContracts arrays respectively. When more Repos and OptionsContracts are created, these arrays grow in length.

Because there is no function that decreases the length of those arrays once those Repos and OptionsContracts are not needed, it is dangerous to loop through these arrays when they are too big.

In the contract OptionsContract the length of the repos array is used twice as a boundary for a for loop.

Because anyone can call the public openRepo function, someone could start creating Repos until the length of repos is too big to be processed in a block. At that moment, the function could not be called anymore.

Because the only function that uses the length of the repos array is getReposByOwner, and no other function calls getReposByOwner, the issue will not freeze the contract’s logic. Nevertheless, consider removing unbounded loops from the contract logic in case a child contract uses a function implementing one of the loops.


[N01] No way to check liquidation allowance

Currently in OptionsContract contract, there is no way to check the maximum liquidation allowance. During a liquidation situation, liquidators have to blindly request an oToken amount they want to liquidate when calling liquidate.

Although it is within liquidator’s interest to liquidate as many oTokens as possible, there is no easy way to find out the maximum limit. The liquidate function will revert if liquidators try to liquidate too many oTokens. This design is not very user-friendly for liquidators, and it might cause liquidation events to fail multiple times due to the wrong balance being requested.

Consider adding a function to allow liquidators to get the maximum liquidation allowance for a certain Repo, or just allow liquidators to liquidate the maximum amount if their requests are over the maximum limit.

[N02][Fixed] Usage of SafeMath in non-uint256 variables

In the OptionsContract contract, the function liquidate uses the SafeMath library with non-uint256 variables in L518 and 520 where the value is casted from int32 to uint32. Consider casting to uint256 instead.

Later, in the isSafe function (L592 and 595) uint32 values are used along with the SafeMath.mul method. Consider casting the operation to uint256.

Update: Fixed in the follow-up commit 3adfd9afa6d463869d9e0a78cc7f316ae34eb89e where all variables mentioned in the issue are casted to uint256.

[N03][Fixed] oTokens can still be burnt after the contract expires

In OptionsContract, the function burnOTokens should be limited to before the contract expires. There is no need to call this function after it expires, similar to the counterpart actions like issueoTokens, or add and remove collateral.

Consider adding a time check in the burnOTokens function.

Update: Fixed in the follow-up commit 3adfd9afa6d463869d9e0a78cc7f316ae34eb89e where a notExpired modifier is added to the function.

[N04][Fixed] Change uint to uint256

Throughout the code base, some variables are declared as uint. To favor explicitness, consider changing all instances of uint to uint256. For example,, the following lines in OptionsContract:

  • Line 200 returns (uint) should be returns (uint256)
  • Line 315 returns (uint[] memory) should be returns (uint256[] memory)
  • Line 316 uint[] should be uint256[]
  • Line 318 uint index = 0 should be uint256 index = 0
  • Line 327 uint[](count) should be uint256[](count)

Update: Fixed in the follow-up commit 3adfd9afa6d463869d9e0a78cc7f316ae34eb89e, all issues above are either fixed or removed due to code update.

[N05] External contracts addresses should be constants

The OptionsUtils contract provides basic functionalities regarding the available exchanges, the oracle, and how to tell if an asset is ETH.

Both the Compound Oracle and the Uniswap Factory addresses are stored in 2 public variables called COMPOUND_ORACLE and UNISWAP_FACTORY and those are assigned to the current addresses from the beginning.

During the constructor function those variables are overridden using the parameters provided during the deployment, making the original assignments unnecessary.

On the other hand, OptionsContract and OptionsExchange are the contracts that inherit OptionsUtils, however, a new OptionsContract will copy the values set in the current OptionsExchange to its COMPOUND_ORACLE and UNISWAP_FACTORY variables. Since there is no way to change these values in OptionsExchange after deployment plus the optionsExchange variable from OptionsFactory cannot be updated, the entire project would need to be re-deployed in order to change those variables. Instead of assigning these values twice, it is good enough to set the COMPOUND_ORACLE and UNISWAP_FACTORY addresses directly in OptionsUtils as constant.

Consider declaring the variables as constant.

[N06][Fixed] Default visibility

Some state variables in OptionsContract are using the default public visibility. Consider declaring explicitly the visibility of all the variables for better readability.

These are some of them: liquidationIncentive, transactionFee, liquidationFactor, liquidationFee, windowSize, totalExercised, totalFee, totalUnderlying, totalCollateral, and collateralExp.

Update: Fixed in the follow-up commit 3adfd9afa6d463869d9e0a78cc7f316ae34eb89e where state variable visibilities are clearly stated.

[N07][Fixed]Empty lines

There are some empty lines inside OptionsContract such as L39, L98, and L421.

To favor readability, consider using a linter such as Solhint.

Update: Fixed in the follow-up commit 3adfd9afa6d463869d9e0a78cc7f316ae34eb89e where empty lines are removed

[N08][Fixed] Lack of checks

Certain functions in this project will execute even if the given parameters are not actually updating any state variable values.

For instance,

These scenarios could emit useless events or compromise the functionality of the project. Consider adding parameter checks to these functions.

Update: Fixed in the follow-up commit 3adfd9afa6d463869d9e0a78cc7f316ae34eb89e where proper validations and checks are added.

[N9][Partially Fixed] Misleading variable names

Update: Partially Fixed in the follow-up commit 3adfd9afa6d463869d9e0a78cc7f316ae34eb89e where some of the variable names have been updated.

[N10][Fixed] Unknown use of multiple Repos per account

The OptionsContract allows any user to create a new Repo by calling the openRepo function.

However at the moment a single address can create as many Repos as they want but without getting a explicit benefit.

Consider adding to the documentation what are the benefits of doing this, or removing the possibility of having multiple Repos per account and allowing only one.

Update: Fixed in the follow-up commit 3adfd9afa6d463869d9e0a78cc7f316ae34eb89e where repos are replaced by vaults and only one vault is allowed per user._

[N11][Fixed] Inverse order of operations

In the OptionsUtils contract, the getExchange function creates a pointer to the exchange instance for the queried _token by using the getExchange function from the Uniswap factory contract, and then it checks if the address retrieved from Uniswap’s getExchange is zero.

Consider first checking if the address returned by UNISWAP_FACTORY.getExchange(_token) in L26 is zero before linking the queried exchange instance into the local variable exchange.

Update: Fixed in line 29 of the follow-up commit 3adfd9afa6d463869d9e0a78cc7f316ae34eb89e.

[N12][Fixed] Mismatch case for payable address

The TransferRepoOwnership event takes the Repo index, the old owner, and the new one. The event is only triggered when the transferRepoOwnership function is called, a function that allows the old owner to change the ownership of the Repo. There is an issue with the way parameters are defined: the new owner is defined as address payable, however the old owner is only an address. Because the function updates the owner variable in the repos array, which is defined as address payable, consider changing the parameter definition of the event.

There is a similar issue in the liquidate function: The Liquidate event is defined using an address parameter, however when it is used in the liquidate function, msg.sender can be payable if the collateral is ETH. Consider updating the variable type in the event.

Update: Fixed in the follow-up commit 3adfd9afa6d463869d9e0a78cc7f316ae34eb89e.

[N13][Fixed] Repo owners might not know their collateral balance

The project team mentioned that they are implementing new code into the getRepoByIndex function to return the collateral balance of a Repo owner. However, it might be confusing for a Repo owner to see their collateral value drops due to other users calling the exercise function.
This issue was pointed out to us by the project team and asked for our recommendation.

The fact is when the collateral drops, the underlying contained in the contract increases with each exercise call. It might be beneficial to return both the collateral and underlying balances when a Repo owner checks their balance. It is self-explanatory that when other users call exercise, the collateral balance drops while the underlying balance increases. Consider retrieving both balances to the Repo owner to prevent confusions about their balances.

Update: Fixed in the follow-up commit 3adfd9afa6d463869d9e0a78cc7f316ae34eb89e where the newly added getVault() function returns both the collateral and underlying balances.

[N14][Partially Fixed] Misleading comments, variable names, and documentation typos

Since the purpose of the Ethereum Natural Specification (NatSpec) is to describe the code to end users, misleading statements should be considered a violation of the public API.

In the audited contracts, several functions have incomplete, or non-existent, docstrings which need to be completed.

In OptionsContract:

  • strikePrice should be strikePrice.
  • There are ToDo comments along the code which shows that part of the functionalities are not ready yet.
  • In L36, L40, and L43 a method is used to convert an integer to percentage (using the net percentage without adding the 100%), but in L47 and L162 it used a different method, which is not congruent to the previous one. For example, for the L40 definition 1054 == 105.4% but for the L47 definition, 1054 == 5.4%. Consider using only one method to calculate the percentage.
  • collatera should be collateral.
  • indecies should be indices.
  • In the exercise function a docstring implies that L270 transfers oTokens to the contract, but actually it burns them.
  • Functions that move oTokens from the user account, such as addERC20Collateral and exercise, do not say that the user has to allow the contract to handle their oTokens on his behalf before these functions are called.
  • The docstrings of the addETHCollateral function do not say what the return value is.
  • The revert message in the exercise function mentions the use of pTokens instead of the current oTokens.
  • There are places, such as L14, L15, L20, L26, L32, L34, L36, and L40, where it should be explained with more detail what the variable/contract does.
  • For the Number variables, such as the ones in L36, L40, L43, L47, and L51, it would be ideal add those examples to the actual Number structure in L20 and explicitly explain the formula that links the value with the exponent.

In OptionsExchange:
– The functions sellPTokens and buyPTokens, along with their _pTokens parameters, implies the use of pTokens instead of oTokens. If these are a different type of tokens, then it should be explained in the documentation.

In the whitepaper:

  • “cryptoassets” in the section 1.1 line 2 should be “crypto assets”.
  • “marketplaces marketplace” in the section 3.3.1 paragraph 2 line 4-5 should be “marketplaces”.

Update: _ Partially Fixed in the follow-up commit 3adfd9afa6d463869d9e0a78cc7f316ae34eb89e. Some of these issues are fixed in the new commit._

[N15] Funds cannot be withdrawn under certain conditions

After the OptionsContract has expired, the forgotten funds in collateral or underlying will remain in the contract forever.

Consider adding an extra time checkpoint, such as terminated, when it would be possible to withdraw the forgotten funds in the contract after this period is reached.

[N16] Unnecessary code

There are some uncessary code through out the project, for example

Consider removing all unnecessary code.

[N17][Fixed] Unneeded assignment

In the OptionsContract contract, the variable oTokenExchangeRate is defined and assigned but then, during the constructor, it is again assigned with the parameter value _oTokenExchangeExp.

Because the first assignment will not matter when the contract is deployed, consider removing it during the declaration of the variable.

Update: Fixed in the follow-up commit 3adfd9afa6d463869d9e0a78cc7f316ae34eb89ewhere the oTokenExchangeRate value is only assigned once in the Constructor.


One critical and two high severity issues were found. Some changes were proposed to follow best practices and reduce potential attack surface. Some of the issues are fixed in the follow up fix commit as stated in the update section, details are also presented under individual issues.

Update: The Opyn team has fixed the critical issue and implemented partial fixes and monitoring solutions for all high issues in their follow up commit.