This security assessment was prepared by OpenZeppelin.
We audited the semiotic-ai/timeline-aggregation-protocol-contracts repository at two commits on largely the same body of code. The first scope is at the d8795c7 commit covering the core functionality of the Timeline Aggregation Protocol (TAP). The second scope is at the 7f663fb commit, adding additional access control restrictions. Every issue is valid for both scopes, however, the links in the issue descriptions only refer to the first scope's commit.
In both scopes were the following contracts:
src/
├── AllocationIDTracker.sol
├── Escrow.sol
├── IStaking.sol
└── TAPVerifier.sol The Timeline Aggregation Protocol (TAP) is a payment system between Indexers and gateways. It aims to aggregate the receipts per allocation to settle payments for the queries served by Indexers for each gateway. This implementation is based on the Graph Improvement Proposal GIP-0054. TAP extends the existing Scalar payment system by allowing multiple gateways, aggregated receipts, and minimized trust between the payers and payees.
The smart contracts interact with off-chain components of the TAP protocol, where query receipts are signed and eligible receipts are aggregated into Receipt Aggregate Vouchers (RAVs) for each allocation period. The RAVs are subsequently signed by an authorized signer from each gateway. A gateway can deposit an amount of GRT tokens specifically destined for an Indexer, which can be claimed with a signed RAV. The RAV signature conforms to EIP-712 and is verified on-chain by TAPVerifier.sol. Only a single RAV can be redeemed for each allocation from each sender. However, multiple vouchers can be redeemed for the same allocationID so long as they originate from different gateways. This is different from the current AllocationExchange.sol contract, which only allows Indexers to claim a voucher for an allocationID once globally.
Both the signing and receipts aggregation processes are off-chain, and thus out of scope for this audit. The on-chain components interact closely with the off-chain ones, as well as The Graph's existing smart contracts. Integrated tests of the whole system are highly recommended. It is assumed that the off-chain components will function as expected.
Three role types are expected to interact with the smart contracts: senders (gateways), signers and receivers (Indexers).
Signers are authorized by senders to sign RAVs for receivers.Senders can revoke signers after a thawing period.Senders can deposit to any receiver and withdraw any unclaimed deposit after a grace period.In the first scope, anyone is allowed to be a sender, thus being able to push any amount of GRT tokens through to The Graph's Staking contract via the TAP. This may have side effects on other aspects of The Graph's ecosystem. In the second scope, senders need to be whitelisted as AUTHORIZED_SENDERs and managed via a trusted DEFAULT_ADMIN role.
redeem Can Prevent Indexers From Receiving Rewards for AllocationsThe redeem function in Escrow.sol enables Indexers to receive query rewards by submitting a signed Receipt Aggregate Voucher (RAV) and allocationIDProof. However, anyone who knows the contents of a valid signedRAV and allocationIDProof can call redeem regardless of whether the proof and signed RAV belong to them. This is because redeem only checks that the contents and signature of the passed-in signedRAV and allocationIDProof are valid, but does not check that the caller is the originator of the signatures and calldata. Additionally, the function uses the caller to determine the amount of GRT that will be sent as the query reward to the Staking contract.
Consequently, a malicious user who knows a valid signedRAV and allocationIDProof can call redeem, which, if the user does not have a GRT balance in the Escrow contract, will result in zero GRT being rewarded for an allocationID. This also prevents future calls to redeem that correspond to the same allocationID as the ID will have been marked as used in the AllocationIDTracker as part of the redeem function's logic. This effectively prevents an Indexer from being rewarded for a given allocationID. The following example outlines a proposed attack against an Indexer:
redeem with their signedRAV and allocationIDProof on the Ethereum Mainnet.Escrow contract, zero GRT will be awarded to the allocationID via the collect call. Note that both redeem and collect (in Staking.sol) will pass even though zero GRT is awarded to an Indexer. Additionally, this uses the allocationID in the AllocationIDTracker contract.useAllocationID will now revert.Consider deriving the Indexer address to pull GRT from via the getAllocation function in the Staking contract instead of using the msg.sender as the expected address in the redeem function. This prevents the wrong address' EscrowAccount 's GRT balance from being used and always ensures that regardless of who calls redeem, the correct address will be used when moving GRT to the Staking contract.
Update: Resolved in pull request #58. The Graph's core developers stated:
Thank you for finding and highlighting this critical issue. We have investigated it further and discussed a few solutions. To prevent possible front-running attacks and allow the vesting contracts to redeem, we decided to proceed with the suggested solution to use the Indexer indicated in the allocation as the receiver (i.e., obtaining the receiver address from the staking contract using
allocationID). The associated issue can be found here.
redeem Lacks Slippage ProtectionThe redeem function in Escrow.sol contains the logic to determine the amount of GRT rewards an Indexer will receive as the minimum of the currently available escrow balance and the aggregated amount in the voucher. This allows slippage to occur against the Indexer (i.e., the Indexer may get less than what is deemed acceptable).
The redeem function does not allow the Indexer to specify an expected amount of rewards to receive. Therefore, it is possible that the Indexer receives fewer rewards than expected, at which point the voucher that was worth more has been used and cannot be re-used. This could surprise the Indexer, who may have otherwise expected the call to revert if the full reward amount could not be given to them.
Consider adding a parameter to the redeem function that allows the caller to specify an expected reward amount. If the calculated amount is not greater than or equal to the expected amount, the call should revert.
Update: Partially resolved in pull request #61. The Graph's core developers stated:
We decided to leave the code as is (option #2). This allows flexibility while maintaining a low gas cost. We have updated the inline documentation to detail the expectations of Indexers during
thaws andredeems. Some context for the decision: Whenever athawcommences and threatens to reduce the escrow account below the owed amount, the Indexer software should promptly act to close any pending RAVs with that gateway. Otherwise, the Indexer should act as if anything being thawed has already been withdrawn. Complete transparency exists regarding an account: Indexers can verify values anytime, and numerous events (like deposit, thaw, withdraw, redeem, and other account interactions) are signaled. The only methods to withdraw money from an account are either under the Indexer's control (redeem) or are subject to a time-lock (withdraw). The associated issue can be found here.
In both the verifyProof and verifyAuthorizedSignerProof functions, the messageHash does not include the chainId. Since the project will be deployed on both Ethereum and Arbitrum networks, the same signed message intended for one chain can be replayed on the other chain.
Consider adding the chainId, as well as the nonce or deadline to the message's content when generating proofs to ensure that signed messages are only used on the intended blockchain, and not replayable multiple times.
Update: Resolved in pull request #56. The Graph's core developers stated:
Thank you for highlighting this issue. After several discussions, we fixed this by adding a
chainIDto theallocationIDproof (a deadline is not needed since a usedallocationIDcannot be unset). The authorized signer proof needs achainIDand a deadline because signers can be revoked, which could enable a possible replay attack. The associated issue can be found here.
redeemCertain users participate in The Graph's protocol via a vesting contract, which enables them to be awarded GRT over a period of time and still utilize the tokens for staking, curating, and delegating. In order to prevent the awarded GRT from escaping the vesting lock before the end of the vesting period, the smart contract restricts function calls and function call targets to only those approved by The Graph. Therefore, Indexers that are vesting contracts would initially be unable to call redeem in the Escrow contract until the function signature and address are approved by The Graph. This is because the redeem function's logic currently calculates the amount of GRT rewards to forward to the Staking contract from the caller of the function.
Consider deriving the Indexer address to pull GRT from via the getAllocation function in the Staking contract instead of using the msg.sender as the expected address in the redeem function. This allows an Indexer who is also a vesting contract to use a separate caller to call the redeem function and still get the correct amount of GRT rewards without having to approve the redeem function signature for all vesting contracts.
Update: Resolved in pull request #58. The Graph's core developers stated:
This issue is fixed with the same solution as C-01, linking it to the same pull request. The associated issue can be found here.
TAP contracts are tested against mocks of The Graph's contracts (such as Staking), which works well for unit tests. However, having integration tests that test against the deployed contracts with varied inputs, such as using different fee-tiers, ensures there are no undesirable side effects to other parts of the ecosystem.
Update: Acknowledged, will resolve. The Graph's core developers stated:
Thank you for raising this issue. We will not be addressing it now, as we are going to do thorough integration tests after the audit. They are going to be part of a larger Scalar TAP deployment plan and it is going to be a joint effort between Semiotic Labs, Edge & Node and The Graph Foundation.
The thaw function in Escrow.sol will succeed and emit the Thaw event for any caller that specifies zero as the amount to thaw, even if the caller has not deposited any GRT into the contract. Allowing the contract to emit an arbitrary number of Thaw events could disrupt off-chain monitoring. Consider adding a check to ensure the passed-in amount to thaw is greater than zero.
Update: Resolved in pull request #54 at commit 73efad0. The Graph's core developers stated:
We added a check for the thaw request amount to be greater than 0. In the first pull request #54, we checked if
amount <= 0, but as it is auint256, we modified this to checkif == 0, along with the thaw fixes, pointing to the last commit. The associated issue can be found here.
push0 OPCODE Incompatible With ArbitrumThe push0 OPCODE (EIP-3855) is implemented in the latest Shanghai EVM version, which is the default version for the Solidity compiler 0.8.20 or higher. As of the time of writing, Arbitrum does not yet support the push0 opcode. Thus, one should either cap the Solidity version to 0.8.19 or carefully set the EVM target to a lower version than the default one.
Update: Resolved in pull request #55. The Graph's core developers stated:
We capped the Solidity version to 0.8.18. The associated issue can be found here.
thawSigner May Be IneffectiveThe thawSigner function in Escrow.sol allows a sender to initiate the process of revoking authorization from a signer address. After initiating thawSigner, the signer can continue to sign vouchers that can be redeemed until the signer is revoked.
This process allows a sender to initiate thawSigner as soon as the signer is authorized. After the thaw period is over, the sender has full discretion on when to revoke the signers, which can take effect immediately. This consequently disables the redemption of any vouchers signed by the address without a grace period. The grace period during which any signed vouchers by the outgoing signer can be redeemed is thus rendered ineffective. Further, there is no way to cancel this action, which hinders the user experience.
Consider reassessing the effectiveness of thawSigner and revokeAuthorizedSigner's functionality, and decide whether they can be removed.
Update: Partially resolved in pull request #59. The Graph team stated:
Thank you for posting this issue. After discussing this with our partners from Edge & Node, we concluded that we do not fully align with the problem's statement. As the
thawSignerwill be called from the Indexer software, we decided to enhance its documentation to provide more meaningful details. "Thawing a signer" is designed to alert Indexers that signatures from that signer will soon be deemed invalid. Indexers without existing signed receipts or RAVs from this signer should, in essence, treat them as unauthorized. Those with existing signed documents from this signer should work towards settling their engagements. They can either initiate an RAV request using the signed receipts (with a new signer in place), redeem their most recent RAV, or request a new RAV associated with a different signer. Once a signer is thawed, they should, for all practical reasons, be viewed as revoked regardless of their revocation status. Given this context, we are confident in the current implementation's efficacy in serving as an alert mechanism, especially with the emitted event and provided grace period, which lets Indexers act accordingly. While we do not plan on altering the code based on this suggestion, we will enhance our documentation to ensure such expectations are conveyed transparently. The associated issue can be found here.
The getEscrowAccountFromSignerAddress function accepts a signer as its argument and subsequently infers the sender address to return the amount of EscrowAccount deposited by the sender to the receiver. If a signer is revoked by the sender, the function will return 0 despite the fact that there could be non-zero amounts in escrow left for the receiver by the sender.
Consider reverting with an error message indicating that the signer is no longer authorized.
Update: Resolved in pull request #53. The Graph's core developers stated:
It was previously ambiguous as to whether
getEscrowAccountFromSignerAddressreturned zero values because the account is empty or the signer is not actually authorized (possibly revoked). This fixes that by reverting with a custom error if the signer is not authorized. The associated issue can be found here.
In TAPVerifier.sol, the import Address is unused and could be removed.
Consider removing unused imports to improve the overall clarity and readability of the codebase.
Update: Resolved in pull request #47. The Graph's core developers stated:
We removed the
Addressimport. The associated issue can be found here.
The thaw function in Escrow.sol can only increase the value to be withdrawn from an EscrowAccount. Additionally, the only way to reset the amountThawing for an EscrowAccount to zero is to call withdraw, which will pull the requested GRT from the account. Therefore, there is no way to cancel a thaw action. This can lead to a poor user experience for depositors and accounts. Consider creating an additional function, cancelThaw, that reduces the amountThawing value for an account to zero.
Update: Resolved in pull request #52. The Graph's core developers stated:
If the requested amount is zero, any thawing in progress will be cancelled. If the requested amount is greater than zero, any thawing in progress will be cancelled and a new thawing request will be initiated. The associated issue can be found here.
The following typographical errors were identified:
reciever to receiver.neccessary to necessary.Update: Resolved in pull request #51. The Graph's core developers stated:
The associated issue can be found here.
unchecked Arithmetic BlocksThe following arithmetic in Escrow.sol occurs in unchecked blocks:
There does not appear to be an underflow risk in the logic as the amount deducted is always less than or equal to the escrow balance. Inserting mathematical operations inside an unchecked block will reduce the amount of gas used in a transaction. However, in case of unpredictable scenarios (e.g., unknown compiler issues), having an underflow in the balance variable would be disastrous. We recommend a safer approach by removing the unchecked block to allow the compiler to insert overflow and underflow guards
Update: Resolved in pull request #50. The Graph's core developers stated:
We agree it is not worth the risk to save the gas costs. The associated issue can be found here.
The signature for a Receipt Aggregate Voucher (RAV) is intended to be compliant with EIP-712. However, there is a discrepancy in the typeHash. Per EIP-712, the typeHash includes the encodeType for a struct, which is encoded as:
The type of a struct is encoded as name ‖ "(" ‖ member₁ ‖ "," ‖ member₂ ‖ "," ‖ … ‖ member ₙ ")" where each member is written as type ‖ " " ‖ name.
However, the name of the encoded struct in the typeHash within TAPVerifier.sol is ReceiptAggregateVoucher, whereas the name of the corresponding struct defined in the contract is ReceiptAggregationVoucher ("Aggregate" vs. "Aggregation"). The name of the struct in TAPVerifier.sol should be identical to the name used in the typeHash, otherwise, the signature is not fully compliant with EIP-712.
Consider renaming the struct to be identical to the name used in the typeHash.
Update: Resolved in pull request #49. The Graph's core developers stated:
The
ReceiptAggregationVoucherstruct was renamed toReceiptAggregateVoucher. The associated issue can be found here.
AllocationIDTracker.sol: The word 'collateral' should be changed to 'escrow' as it is referring to the renamed Escrow contract.AllocationIDTracker.sol: The word 'collateral' should be changed to 'escrow' as it is referring to the renamed Escrow contract.thawEndTimestamp represents a timestamp.thawEndTimestamp represents a timestamp.Consider addressing these instances of incorrect documentation.
Update: Resolved in pull request #48. The Graph's core developers stated:
Good catch, fixed. The associated issue can be found here.
One critical-severity and a few medium-severity issues were identified during this audit. These issues stem from the increased surface area of external interactions that the TAP contracts allow. Additional suggestions were made to increase operational similarities between the TAP contracts and the current AllocationExchange contract.